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get a charge size at which the new visors would 
survive. The test data in which the three cate-
gories of visor can be compared starts with vi-
sor “New 6.”
Photographs and high-speed video were 
taken of the visor blast trials. The photographs 
in Table 2 (see page 73) show the extent of 
damage to the visors that were broken in the 
trial, as well as the post-blast photos of the vi-
sors that did not break. During the trials, the 
pieces of broken visor were found dispersed 
throughout the tent area and the pieces were 
photographed where they landed. All visor 
pieces were then collected and reconstructed 
for the photographs as illustrated in Table 2 
(see page 73). 
Ballistic Test Results
The results of the ballistic tests were much 
more difficult to interpret. IMAS 10.30 states 
in paragraph 4.3: “PPE provided to reduce 
the risk from such a hazard should include, 
as a minimum … ballistic body armour with 
a STANAG 2920 V50 rating (dry) of 450m/s.” 
It continues, “Eye protection should be no 
less than that offered by 5mm of untreated 
polycarbonate.”10 It does not explicitly state 
that the visor should provide a V50 rating of 
450m/s, nor does it explicitly define what V50 
rating provides an acceptable level of pro-
tection. Indeed, it is possible to use the note 
about 5mm polycarbonate to allow any V50 
rating to be acceptable as long as the visor 
is made of polycarbonate 5mm or thicker. 
This ambiguity makes evaluation of the re-
sults somewhat problematic.
Table 3 (see page 74) shows the V50 test data 
for the new visor. The strike velocity is the ve-
locity at which the projectile struck the face of 
the visor. If the projectile traveled through the 
visor and kept moving, its exit velocity was 
shown as residual velocity. Residual velocity 
was not captured in all cases. To calculate V50 , 
three shots that did not penetrate and three 
shots that did penetrate were selected, while 
attempting to keep the strike velocities reason-
ably similar (the target was within 60m/s). 
This method prevents the far outlying data 
such as shot 1 from influencing the V50 value.
The V50 ballistic tests are summarized in 
Table 4 (see previous page). They show that 
within the error of one standard deviation, all 
three conditions of the visors have effective-
ly the same V50 rating. If anything, the heat 
treatment may have improved the V50 perfor-
mance slightly.
Figure 3 (see previous page) presents the 
results of the ballistic testing in a way that al-
lows comparison of the three conditions. The 
data points along the horizontal axis show the 
shots in which complete penetration did not 
occur (residual velocity is zero), while those 
above the horizontal axis show those that did 
penetrate completely. 
A variety of trend lines can be drawn 
through the three data sets, but they are very 
close to overlapping. With the wide spread 
of velocities and relatively few data points, 
there is really little or no significant differ-
ence among the three curves. In other words, 
these tests suggest that neither the scratching 
nor the heat treatment of the visors degraded 
the new visors from a V50 ballistics standpoint.
Discussion
The results of the blast testing illustrate 
that the threshold for visor breakage for 
scratched, heat-repaired, and even new vi-
sors was far below the recommended charge 
size, when 200g C4 was used. Comparison of 
the results of the blast testing of the scratched 
visors with the scratched and heat-treated vi-
sors, as noted in Table 2 (see page 73), reflects 
more extensive shattering of the heat-treat-
ed visors. The significance of this difference 
would require further testing, especially since 
all three groups of visors were found to break 
at less than half of the specified CEN Work-
shop Agreement charge size.
Observations from field experience sug-
gest that visors subjected to detonations of up 
to 240g TNT do not tend to shatter as they did 
in these tests. Assuming these observations to 
be accurate, it could indicate that there was a 
flaw in the experiment or that the CWA op-
tion to use a substitute for TNT needs to be re-
viewed; either the equivalency criteria need to 
be changed, or perhaps no substitute for TNT 
should be allowed. More experimentation will 
be needed to answer this question.
With regard to the V50 ballistic testing of 
the visors, it was seen that all three groups 
performed comparably. The estimated V50 falls 
between 225 and 250 m/s for all three groups, 
with no statistically significant difference 
among the new visors, scratched visors and 
heat-treated visors. STANAG 2920 is not clear 
with respect to what V50 rating is required for 
visors; it may be 450 m/s or it may simply be 
a 5-mm-thick, untreated polycarbonate visor 
with no requirement for a specific V50 rating. 
Further, if the CEN Workshop Agreement 
(CWA 15756) is taken as “an accepted alterna-
tive ... developed as an international standard” 
(IMAS 10.30, para 4.3.a10), then a less damag-
ing fragment may now be more appropriate for 
future tests of this type. 
Conclusions
Following the blast and ballistic testing of 
the visors, it was determined that: 
•	  Scratching the visors did not appear to 
have any detrimental effects on the blast 
resistance of the visors.
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•	  The proposed heat treatment of the 
scratched visors appears to degrade the 
blast resistance of the visors.
•	  All of the visors, including new ones, 
were broken during blast tests using 
charge sizes half the size recommended 
by the relevant standards.
•	  Neither the scratching nor the heat-
treating process appears to have any det-
rimental effects on the V50 performance 
of the visors under test. The V50 ratings 
for new, scratched and heat-treated vi-
sors fall within the 225–250m/s range.
•	  Contrary to popular opinion, there is 
actually no requirement to have visors 
achieve a V50 rating of 450m/s.
•	  There is a need to investigate whether 
the revised CWA should allow substitu-
tions for TNT, and if so, what equiva-
lency criteria should be applied. 
See Endnotes, Page 79 
Amending the Ottawa Convention: A Way Forward, Barlow [ from page 4 ]
1. Keeley, Robert. “Clearing the Falkland-Malvinas Islands.” The Journal of ERW 
and Mine Action, Issue 13.1 (Summer 2009: 7–8). Available at http://tinyurl.com/
ya6nfnz. Accessed 30 September 2009.
2. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer 
of Anti-personnel Mines and Their Destruction. 17 December 1997. http://tinyurl.
com/m6e8jq. Accessed 22 September 2009.
Aid Effectiveness in Insecure Areas, Naidoo [ from page 6 ]
1. Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. 2 March 2005. Paris. http://tinyurl.com/
djjuzh. Accessed 5 October 2009.
2. Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situa-
tions. April 2007. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
http://tinyurl.com/pvpncr. Accessed 5 October 2009.
3. Accra Agenda for Action. 25 July 2008. Accra. http://tinyurl.com/5kwljp. Accessed 5 
October 2009.
4. Roberts, Rebecca. “Reflections on the Paris Declaration and Aid Effectiveness in 
Afghanistan.” Discussion Paper, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. April 
2009. http://tinyurl.com/y9apaaf. Accessed 6 October 2009.
5. Whole-of-government approaches refers to public-service agencies working across 
portfolio boundaries and, in this context, typically involves ministries responsible 
for defense, diplomacy and development working closely together.
6. Policy coherence refers to greater coherence in policies across sectors that affect de-
veloping countries (e.g., trade and development).
7. Accra Agenda for Action. Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. 2–4 
September 2008. Accra, Ghana. http://tinyurl.com/n9nefv. Accessed 21 August 2009. 
8. Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. http://tinyurl.com/ltuzc5. 
Accessed 21 August 2009.
9. MAG. “Burundi.” http://tinyurl.com/knz3vl. Accessed 5 October 2009.
10. MAG. “Burundi: Supporting human security.” http://tinyurl.com/dlh9ek. Accessed 
5 October 2009. 
11. MAG. “MAG’s approach to Conventional Weapons Management and Disposal.” 
http://tinyurl.com/ngykpu. Accessed 5 October 2009.
12. Danish Refugee Council and Danish Demining Group. Concept Paper: Community 
Safety in North West Somalia (Somaliland). February 2009. http://tinyurl.com/mstztl. 
Accessed 21 August 2009.
Regional Cooperation: MDD Center for SE Europe, Trlin [ from page 9 ]
1. The Mine Detection Dog Center for South East Europe is mainly designed to train 
mine-detection-dog teams for use in regional mine-action centers and demining 
entities, to support demining efforts in the region with its own MDD teams, and to 
provide expertise and knowledge in area of MDD use. However, MDDC also trains 
other kinds of official dogs, e.g., drug- and explosive-detection dogs, police-patrol 
dogs, search-and-rescue dogs, etc. 
2. Mine Detection Dog Center for South East Europe was established by a Memoran-
dum of Understanding signed by the U.S. Department of State (Office of Humani-
tarian Demining Programs), Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Civil Affairs, and 
the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance on 22 Oc-
tober 2002, and officially opened on 14 October 2003, with initial funds from the 
U.S. Department of State (HDP). Since the start of operation, MDDC has trained 
approximately 150 dogs.
3. “Mine Detection Dogs.” Humanitarian Demining Standard for South East Europe. 
South-Eastern Europe Mine Action Coordination Council. http://tinyurl.com/lvh4dl. 
Accessed 25 August 2009.
4. Prior to starting a demining task, each demining team, consisting of one dog and 
one handler, must undergo the accreditation process to verify their performance 
and capability. Procedures of accreditation vary from country to country, but are 
basically consistent on testing and issuing periodic accreditations.
USAFRICOM’s Approach to International Stability, Wuestewald [ from page 12]
1. Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2009, Twelfth Edition. United Nations Mine 
Action Service. U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Pg 59–263. 
http://tinyurl.com/kunko6. Accessed 9 October 2009.
2. “U.S. Africa Command.” United States Africa Command. http://tinyurl.com/
l3uaut. Accessed 24 August 2009.
3. E-mail interview with Denise Shorey, Commander, U.S. Navy. U.S. Africa Com-
mand Public Affairs. 10 July 2009.
4.	 “Questions	and	Answers	about	AFRICOM.”	United	States	Africa	Command.	http://
tinyurl.com/me4nw6. Accessed 24 August 2009.
ITF’s Experience with Regional Cooperation, Buhin [ from page 14 ]
1. International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance: Strategy 
2006–2009. International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance. 
http://tinyurl.com/yevk5oh. Accessed 8 October 2009.
2. Regional Cooperation in Mine Action: The Case of South-Eastern Europe. Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. November 2005.
3. http://tinyurl.com/ylotdp7. Accessed 23 September 2009.
4. Beber Boštjančič, Sabina (ITF). “Regional Approach to Mine Action—Experiences 
and Prospects on the Meeting of the Mine Action Support Group.” PowerPoint pre-
sentation. 27 March 2009. 
5. ITF Annual Reports in period 1999–2009. http://tinyurl.com/laj2nk. Accessed 8 
October 2009.
6. South-Eastern Europe Mine Action Coordination Council. http://tinyurl.com/
ywocqt. Accessed 9 September 2009.
7. Hočevar, Iztok (ITF). “ITF Regional Approach to Mine Action in Central Asia.” 
PowerPoint presentation. 7–8 July 2009.
8. Conversion as of 9 September 2009.
In Remembrance: Felisberto Novele [ from page 17 ] 
1. Evripidou, Stefanos. “UN solider killed in demining accident.” The Free Library. 
http://tinyurl.com/ye77kr8. Accessed 5 November 2009. 
2. “Cyprus.” Electronic Mine Information Network. http://tinyurl.com/yc85wfb. Ac-
cessed 5 November 2009.
3. Kreouzos, Netha. “De-miners – Clearing a path for peace.” The Blue Beret. June/July 
2008. http://tinyurl.com/yl9u9yd. Accessed 5 November 2009. 
UNMAS’s Rapid-response Exercise by Holm, Kuklick and McCoull [ from page 18 ] 
1. Because the exercise is a compressed version of what a possible real scenario would 
be, one “practice day” is one day’s time in the framework of the exercise, but less 
than one day in actual time.
2. The Protection Cluster is a forum for agencies involved in a specific crisis/emergency 
where interventions can be targeted and priorities from different agencies can be dis-
cussed and coordinated. http://tinyurl.com/ycf8e3v. Accessed 12 November 2009.
3. Interview with Maxwell Kerley on the Rapid Response Exercise by the UN TV. 
4. E-mail interview with Angel Belen, Deputy Director, Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency, U.S. Department of Defense. 18 August 2009.
Change is the Only Constant, Gegic [ from page 22  ]
1. Alvin Toff ler’s famous comment originating from a quote by Heraclitus, Greek 
philosopher, 500 B.C.
2. On 18 April 2008, the FSD program in Burundi ceased its field activities due to an 
escalation in armed conflict between government forces and Forces Nationales de 
Libération (the last remaining armed group in Burundi, better known by its acro-
nym FNL). The field activities were on stand down for nearly two months.
3. A drastic example is an attack launched by the Lord’s Resistance Army, a Ugan-
dan rebellion group on the FSD convoy in South Sudan in November 2005 in which 
one international and one national FSD staff member were killed. FSD had no other 
options but to terminate the program due to complete paralysis and powerlessness 
from both United Nations and national authorities to cope with the problem.
4. On 12 March 2008, the FSD mine-clearance team was ambushed by armed ban-
dits while returning from a task in Bururi province, Burundi (the convoy was 
under police escort). As result of the attack, one deminer sustained a minor 
head injury and two vehicles were severely damaged. It was pure luck that more 
serious injuries or deaths were avoided. The remaining tasks in the area were 
suspended and FSD continued working only in areas in close vicinity of main 
and well-guarded roads. This caused yet another change in deployment and op-
erational planning.
Sri Lanka: Mine Action in a Deteriorating Environment, Rush [ from page 24 ]
1. “Agreement on a Ceasefire between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Re-
public of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.” http://tinyurl.com/
lhhnvkl. Accessed 8 July 2009.
2. Muggah, Robert. Relocation Failures in Sri Lanka—A Short History of Internal Dis-
placement and Resettlement. Zed Book: 147. 
3. “Sri Lanka.”Landmine Monitor Report 2002. New York: International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines. http://tinyurl.com/l3wb9q. Accessed 26 June 2009. 
4. “Sri Lanka.”Landmine Monitor Report 2004. New York: International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines. http://tinyurl.com/mjj7jg. Accessed 26 June 2009. 
5. “Sri Lanka.” Landmine Monitor Report 2003. New York: International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines. http://tinyurl.com/lckjcz. Accessed 26 June 2009.
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6. Level Two Survey is the step between identifying danger zones and completely clear-
ing a mine field; it is the process of area reduction. Mine fields are reduced from gen-
eral locations to actual mine field perimeters. Demining personnel enter suspected 
areas then mark off the smaller mined areas, declaring the outside areas safe and 
suitable for use.
7. “Armed Non-state Actors and Landmines.” Global Report of Mine Action. Geneva 
Call 2006: Volume 11: 78.
8. “Sri Lanka.” Landmine Monitor Report 2006. New York: International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines. http://tinyurl.com/mnv53z. Accessed 26 June 2009.
9. “Sri Lanka.” Landmine Monitor Report 2007. New York: International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines. http://tinyurl.com/ld5g96. Accessed 26 June 2009. 
10. “What is the Sri Lankan military up to in Vaharai?” LTTE Peace Secretariat. 
11. “Sri Lanka.” Landmine Monitor Report 2008. New York: International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines. http://tinyurl.com/llq2o8. Accessed 24 June 2009.
12. Meetings with government of Sri Lanka officials, 26 July 2007, 6 March 2008, and 27 
November 2008.
13. Meeting with Mine Programme Manager and Geneva Call. 24 July 2007.
14. E-mail from Mine Programme Manager, 3 July 2006.
15. “Statement on Space for Humanitarian Work—Issues of Safety, Access and Restric-
tions.” Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2006. http://tinyurl.com/nfs6o6. Accessed 10 
May 2009.  
16. “Mine Action in the Midst of Internal Conflict: A Report on the Workshop Organ-
ised by Geneva Call and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines Non-State 
Actors Working Group.” Geneva Call 2005: 43. 
17. E-mail from Jane Filseth Andersen, Norwegian People’s Aid, 2 June 2009
18. “Blow to demining efforts in Sri Lanka: NPA pulls out.” Tamilnet. 2 December 2008. 
http://tinyurl.com/6lj38e. Accessed 15 May 2009.
19. Centre for Policy Alternatives 2009. A profile of Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Issues in the Vanni and Vavuniya, Annex 1: 63.
20. “Demining suspended following killing of NGO staffer.” Tamilnet. 22 August 2007. 
http://tinyurl.com/2ab7f9. Accessed 24 June 2009.
21. Meeting between Mine Action Programme Manager and Geneva Call. Colombo, Sri 
Lanka. 14 October 2006.
22. Meeting with Mine Programme Manager and Geneva Call, 21 July 2007.
23. Meeting with Civil Society Representative and Geneva Call. Geneva, Switzerland. 
2 December 2005.
24. Meeting with a Diplomat and Geneva Call. Colombo, Sri Lanka. 18 July 2007.
25. Speech by Julian Wilson, U.K. Ambassador to Sri Lanka International Day for Mine 
Awareness. 4th April 2006 (internal document).
26. “Mine Action in the Midst of Conflict.” Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation 2005. 
Paper prepared for Mine Action in the Midst of Internal Conflict Workshop. Zagreb, 
Croatia. 27 November 2005.
27. Statement of Sri Lanka at the 7th Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on Their Destruction. 18 September 2006. http://tinyurl.com/mktcpq. 
Accessed 1 April 2009.
28. Geneva Call. Annual Report 2007.
29. Fernado, Shamindra. “While Claymore Attacks continue in Cleared Areas, Funds to 
Demine Tiger Territory Absurd.” The Island, 2006. 12 April 2009.
30. “2009 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: Sri Lanka.” Electronic Mine Information 
Network. http://tinyurl.com/o9gtjm. Accessed 10 September 2009.
Mine-risk Education in Nepal, 2009, Chitrakar [ from page 29 ]
1. NCBL gathers and compiles casualty data continuously. This data was gathered from 
a media report and from facilitators of NCBL. This included landmines and all types 
of explosives. 
The Rapid Response to Operation Cast Lead, Rice [ from page 33 ]
1. United Nations. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1860: 2009. http://
tinyurl.com/9poobj. Accessed 28 August 2009.
2. The civilian population was largely unable to leave Gaza during the conflict (Israel 
controlled exit points), but U.N. and NGO workers were evacuated.
3. Data gathered informally, based on information from the Palestinian Red Crescent 
society and media reports. At this stage, a formal victim data-collection mechanism 
had not been established.
4. UNMAT–GO Situation Briefing Note. February 2009.
The Colombian HD Workshop: Developing a Plan of Action, Cox [ from page 40 ]
1. “Refuerzo en desminado en departamentos más afectados por este flagelo, anuncia 
Estados Unidos.” El Teimpo. http://tinyurl.com/yhfdtuv. Accessed 13 October 2009.
Research in Colombia on Explosives Detection by Rats, Pardo, et. al. [ from page 45 ]
1. See for example: http://tinyurl.com/d4g6fh, http://tinyurl.com/c8fhyz, http://
tinyurl.com/cpca48, http://tinyurl.com/cpo9yw, http://tinyurl.com/y8hkkr3.
2. “Colombia.” Landmine Monitor Report 2008. New York: International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines. http://tinyurl.com/cu875m. Accessed 20 August 2009.
3. “Colombia.” Landmine Monitor Report 2000. New York: International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines. http://tinyurl.com/lujhbh. Accessed 20 August 2009.
4. “Colombia.” Landmine Monitor Report 2001. New York: International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines. http://tinyurl.com/n5jltz. Accessed 20 August 2009.
5. Verhagen, Ron, Frank Weetjens, Christophe Cox, and Bart Weetjens. “Rats to the 
Rescue: Results of the First Test on a Real Minefield.” Journal of Mine Action, 9.2. 
February 2006, 96–100. http://tinyurl.com/cha9cb. Accessed 20 August 2009. 
6.	 “Frequently	 Asked	Questions.”	 Herorat.	 http://tinyurl.com/yj7b4nb.	 Accessed	 20	
November 2009.
7. INVESTUD. “Detección de explosivos mediante la utilización de roedores Rat-
tus norvegicus, cepa Wister.” Universidad e Investigación: Memorias del 1er. En-
cuentro Internacional de Grupos y Semilleros de Investigación, Red Investigare. 
Bogotá, Colombia, 2008, pp. 235–243.
8. Cifuentes Morales, Javier; Méndez Pardo, Luisa Fernanda; Ojeda Rincón, Carolina. 
“Detección de explosivos con ayuda de roedores especie Rattus norvegicus cepa Wi-
star.” Poster presented at the XXXIst Interamerican Congress of Psychology. Mexico 
City, July 2007.
9. Cifuentes Morales, Javier, Isabel Zorro Cáceres, Luisa Fernanda Méndez Pardo, and 
Carolina Ojeda Rincón. “¿Es posible la detección de explosivos con roedores?” Re-
vista Policía Nacional de Colombia. August 2008, pp. 56–57.
10. “Ratas antiexplosivos.” Revista Cromos. 1 May 2006, pp. 48–49.
11. “Crean escuadrón de ratas para detectar minas y otros explosivos.” Diario La Nación 
(Costa Rica). 2 May 2006. http://tinyurl.com/dhgcev. Accessed 20 August 2009.
Geneva Diary: Report from the GICHD, Mansfield [ from page 47 ]
1. “Linking Mine Action and Development: Workshops.” Geneva International Centre 
for Humanitarian Demining. http://tinyurl.com/nbtyqh. Accessed 28 August 2009.
2. “Bibliomines.” Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. http://
tinyurl.com/lqdq6f. Accessed 28 August 2009.
3. “Guide to Cluster Munitions.” Second ed. Geneva International Centre for Humani-
tarian Demining. June 2009. http://tinyurl.com/585xrp. Accessed 8 September 2009.
4. “MDE Catalogue.” Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. 
http://tinyurl.com/lgkve3. Accessed 29 October 2009.
IEDs: A Major Threat for a Struggling Society, Gallego [ from page 49 ]
1. The United States military defines an IED as “A device placed or fabricated in an im-
provised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendi-
ary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incor-
porate military stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary components.” United 
States Department of Defense, The Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint 
Publication 1-02) as amended through 17 March 2009.
2. Diana Carolina Durán Núñez. “La faena de arrancar la mata.” El Espectador. 25 
August 2008.
3. The FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) and the ELN (Ejérci-
to de Liberación Nacional) were created in Colombia in 1964 as Marxist-Leninist 
armed movements against the national government. During their height, around 
the year 2000, they had 40,000 members in Colombia combined, a 45-million-per-
son country. As of today, combined, they are expected to have between 10,000 and 
15,000 members. Unable to engage combat with the State Forces as in previous years, 
their strategy is now to use IEDs and improvised landmines.
4. Associated Press. “Fiscalía española comprobó cooperación Eta—FARC.” El 
Espectador. 14 November 2008.
5. United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008—Colombia. 
30 April 2009.
6. United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008—Chapter 6: 
Terrorist Organizations. 30 April 2009.
7. Official Journal of the European Union, Council of Common Position 2009/67/CFSP. 26 
January 2009.
8. Grupo de Información y Estadística. “Logros de la Política de Consolidación de 
la Seguridad Democrática.” Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de Colombia. 30 
June 2009.
9. Programa Presidencial para la Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal. “Situ-
ación Nacional de Minas Antipersonal.” Vicepresidencia de la República de Colom-
bia. 30 June 2009.
10. Boletín de noticias, Secretaría de Prensa, Presidencia de la República de Colombia. 27 
January 2009.
IEDs and Their Impact on Mine Action, by King [ from page 54 ]
1. Statistics are supplied by the HMS TRITON database of insurgent and terrorist in-
cidents, with technical and tactical assessment carried out by expert analysts. http://
tinyurl.com/tritondb. Requires subscription to access. Accessed 20 October 2009. 
2. “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq.” 
Brookings Institution. 1 September 2009. http://tinyurl.com/2ene9h. Accessed 11 
September 2009.
3. “Landmine Monitor Report 2008: Toward a Mine-Free World, Executive Summary.” 
Landmine Monitor Report 2008. New York: International Campaign to Ban Land-
mines. http://tinyurl.com/n5wk52. Accessed 20 October 2009.
Organization Profile: Humanitarian Peace Support School, Monroe [ from page 60 ]
1. “Kenya.” Landmine Monitor Report 2008.New York: International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines. http://tinyurl.com/lxh3g4. Accessed 19 August 2009.
2. “Humanitarian Peace Support School (HPSS).” Promotional materials received via 
e-mail from Major Mike Liddicoat, Programmes and Plans Officer. Humanitarian 
Peace Support School. 13 August 2009.
3. Untitled. PowerPoint presentation given by Col. Robin Swanson at the Interses-
sional Work Programme for the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. April 2007.
4. Currency conversion as of March 2005.
5. “Kenya: Focus on mine-removal training.” United Nations Office for the Coordina-
tion of Humanitarian Affairs—Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 
ReliefWeb. 9 March 2005. http://tinyurl.com/l2tczy. Accessed 19 August 2009.
6. “IMATC Record of Training 2005–2008.” Spreadsheet received via e-mail from Col. 
Boniface Ngulutu, Commandant. Humanitarian Peace Support School. 14 August 
2009.E-mail interview with Col. Boniface Ngulutu, Commandant. Humanitarian 
Peace Support School. 14 August 2009.
7. “East Africa’s First Dedicated Dog Detection Training Centre Opens for Business.” 
U.K. in Kenya: Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 20 February 2006. http://tinyurl.
com/lgkegs. Accessed 19 August 2009.
8. “UK and Kenya share Firmin Sword of Peace.” Government of the United Kingdom, 
ReliefWeb. 20 July 2007. http://tinyurl.com/n4aat7. Accessed 19 August 2009.
9. “IPSTC Draft Strategic Plan 2009–2011.” Document received via e-mail from Ma-
jor Mike Liddicoat, Programmes and Plans Officer. Humanitarian Peace Support 
School. 13 August 2009.
10. E-mail interview with Major Mike Liddicoat, Programmes and Plans Officer. Hu-
manitarian Peace Support School. 13 August 2009.
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